Confidential liar’s dice · Inco Lightning

The bluff is real.
The roll is secret.

Your dice are sealed on chain, not hidden by the interface. The contract can count them without reading them, so a challenge settles on state neither player could have looked up.

Play the robot Play a friend

No wallet, no transaction, no signup to play the robot. A match takes about two minutes.

Round 1 · best of threeBase Sepolia

Robotrevealed

Current bid

Settled

Youonly you can read these

Four 5s across both hands. The claim was three, so the bid holds and the challenge loses.

At least three dice show 5ChallengeEcho — one of your dice counts twiceAt least four dice show 2Jammer — ignore one opponent dieAt least two dice show 6Scanner — is the current bid true?ChallengeAt least three dice show 5ChallengeEcho — one of your dice counts twiceAt least four dice show 2Jammer — ignore one opponent dieAt least two dice show 6Scanner — is the current bid true?Challenge

The problem

Online liar’s dice has always been a trust exercise pretending to be a game.

The host can see
Every browser dice game asks you to believe an operator you cannot audit. The dice are a number on their server. Nothing stops them being read, and nothing proves they were not.
Server, in the clear
room_41 · seat_0 · dice=[5,2,5,1] room_41 · seat_1 · dice=[5,6,3,5]
On chain, everyone can see
Moving the game on chain makes it worse before it makes it better. Public state is readable by anyone with an RPC endpoint, so hiding a die in the interface hides it from precisely nobody.
eth_getStorageAt · anyone
slot 0x03 → 0x0502050100000000 slot 0x04 → 0x0506030500000000
So nothing is at stake
A bluff only means something if the other side genuinely cannot know. Once hidden information is not really hidden, the raise is theatre and the challenge is a formality. That is not a hard game. It is not a game.
What is left
A dice game where nobody is bluffing.

The contract holds the secret.
It cannot read it either.

A round, end to end

Four moves, and one of them ends it.

The roll nobody can read

Four dice per side, sealed at the moment they are rolled. You see your own as values. Everything the chain holds about them is a handle.

Ciphertext handle0x8f3a…1c21

Your hand

The same hand, on chain

The raise that has to mean something

A raise goes up on quantity, or holds quantity and goes up on face. The table offers the next legal raises so the arithmetic never gets in the way of the decision.

Standing bid

Next legal raise

3 × 53 × 64 × 1

The challenge, counted over sealed dice

Settlement counts matching faces across both hands without either hand being read, then reveals the result. The arithmetic is itemised because the point is that you can check it.

Settled on chain

Challenge settlement

Dice showing 5: 4
echo (yours): +1
Counted against a bid of 3: 5

5 is enough. The bidder takes the round.

One gadget, and they never learn which

Each side draws one per round. Echo counts a die twice, Jammer ignores one of theirs, Scanner tells you whether the standing bid is true. The kind stays sealed even after it has changed the count.

Their gadget this round

EchoJammerScanner

One of these is in play. Nothing on chain says which.

Why the claim survives inspection

Four mechanisms, not four adjectives.

Dice are sealed before they exist to anyone

Each roll is written as an Inco Lightning ciphertext handle. The contract holds the handle and can compute on it. It cannot read the value, and neither can the opponent, the operator, or an indexer.

Only the owner is granted the plaintext

Access is granted per address at the moment of the roll. Your client decrypts your own dice. There is no branch of the code where the other seat is given the same grant.

A challenge is counted, not trusted

Settlement counts matching faces across both sealed hands and compares the total to the claimed quantity. The count runs over the ciphertext; the result is what gets revealed.

The gadget stays secret even after it fires

Each side draws one gadget per round. Its effect lands in the settlement arithmetic without the kind being published, so a used Jammer looks the same on chain as a used Echo.

The alternatives

What you are actually choosing between.

Hecliar compared with a browser dice game and a naive on-chain game
	Browser dice game	Naive on-chain game	Hecliar
Who can read your dice	The operator, always	Anyone with an RPC endpoint	Only you
What settles a challenge	The operator's word	Public state anyone already read	A count over sealed dice
What a bluff is worth	Whatever you trust it to be	Nothing — the hand is visible	The thing the game is made of
To start playing	An account	A wallet and gas	Nothing, against the robot

Before you start

What it actually costs you.

Against the robot

Free

No wallet, no transaction, no account. The match runs locally against a rule-based opponent — fixed rules and probability, no model and no API.

Play the robot

Against a friend

Testnet gas

A wallet and Base Sepolia. One player creates a private room and shares the code; there is no lobby and no matchmaking.

Create a room

Privacy

Not a tier

Confidential dice are not a setting you enable or a plan you upgrade to. They are the rule the game is built on. There is no mode that turns them off.

Two 4s and a hunch.

That is the whole game, and it only works if the other side truly cannot know. Now they cannot.